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THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: TIME TO
LEGISLATE A CRIMINAL STANDARD FOR
PROBABLE CAUSE
Joseph M. Teefey, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

In October of 1978, Congress passed and President Carter approved the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 1 The Act was hailed for striking a balance
between the previously unrestrained power of the Executive to conduct foreign
3
2
intelligence surveillance and individual fights under the Fourth Amendment.
This Act is unique because it limits the Executive's authority to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance in the absence of Supreme Court proscriptions in the
area. 4 However, the probable cause showing required under FISA to obtain a
warrant for electronic surveillance was the subject of debate at the time of passage

1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1979).
2. The term 'foreign intelligence surveillance" refers to electronic national securit) suncillance
conducted within the United States for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.
3. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell stated in testifying in favor of the bill
I believe this bill is remarkable not only in the way it has been developed. but also in the fact that for
the first time in our society the clandestine intelligence activities of our government shall be subject to the
regulation and receive the positive authority of a public law for all to inspect. President Carter stated it
very well in announcing this bill when he said that "one of the most difficult tasks in a free society like
our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to guarantee our nation's security on the one
hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on the other." It is a very delicate balance to strike, but
one which is necessary in our society, and the balance which cannot be achieved by sacrificing either our
nation's security or our civil liberties. In my view this bill strikes the balance, sacrifices neither our
security nor our civil liberties, and assures that the abuses of the past will remain in the past
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977, 95th Cong.. IstSess.. 13 (1977) (statement of
Attorney General Bell).
4. In United States v. United States Dist Ct.. E.D. of Mich.. S.D.. 407 US. 297. 303 (1972).
commonly called Keith, the Supreme Court held that Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. requiring a warrant to issue before any wire sureillance can be
conducted, does not limit the constitutional power of the President in matters affecting national security. This
is the last Supreme Court case to address Presidential power to conduct wire surveillance in the interest of
national security.
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because it permits a non-criminal standard to obtain a judicial warrant.0
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause .

.

. " This language is a reminder of how this amendment reads in

contrast with the Supreme Court's reasonableness interpretation which permits
many exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant clause. 6 Most can agree with
Senator James Abourzek's statement to the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church
Committee") that, "as a matter of principle

. . .

an American ought not to be

targeted for surveillance unless there is probable cause to believe that he may
violate the law."'7 Yet, the Church Committee found that, since the 1930's,
intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens
without the benefit of a judicial warrant. Past subjects of these surveillances have
included a United States Representative, Congressional staff members, journalists
and news reporters, and numerous individuals and groups engaged in no criminal
activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security, such as two
White House domestic affairs advisers and an anti-Vietnam War protest group.8
A look back at the original intent of the Fourth Amendment is informative on
this point. One area of concern for the framers of the Bill of Rights was the
danger of unwarranted searches and seizures of individual's personal effects and
possessions by law enforcement agents. 9 In accordance with English common
law, 10 the framers believed that search warrants could issue only for contraband,
fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime. These objects presuppose that a crime has

5. S. REP. No. 94-1035, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1976) (additional Views of Senators Abourczk. Hart
and Mathias).
6. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretationof the
Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM L REV 119, 122-25 (1989) (detailing the proliferation of exceptions to the
Warrant Clause).
7.

SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE

ACTIVITIES. FINAL REPORT. BOOK II. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S REP. No.

755. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 325 (1976) [hereinafter Church Committee] (Minority Statement of Sen. James
Abourzek).
8. Id.
9. See Warden v. Hayden. 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J.,dissenting) (discussing the
constitutional history of the warrant clause).
10. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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been committed. Likewise, the definition of "agent of a foreign power""1 under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act presupposes that a crime is going to be or
has been committed by the agent. Yet, FISA does not require a criminal standard

probable cause showing for a warrant to issue for electronic surveillance;1" rather,
the probable cause standard under FISA is analogous to the administrative search
standard.13
The relaxed FISA probable cause standard is especially troubling in light of the
frequency

1
with which the FISA Court, commonly called FISC,

grants

11. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1990) reads in relevant part:
"Agent of a foreign power" means(2) any person who(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities foror on behalf or a foreign power.
which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages
in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activitiesInvolve
or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation
therefor, or on behalf of a foreign power or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subparagraph (A). (B). or
(C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A). (B). or (C).
(emphasis added).
12. Applications for FISA electronic surveillance are reviewed by members of a FISA Court. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1803 (1990). A surveillance order will issue if the reviewing judge finds certain conditions have been met.
including probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power, that proposed "minimization procedures" pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (1990) are sufficient under
the terms of the statute, and that the certifications required by 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (1990) have been met.
These certifications include:
(A) that the certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence information:
(B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information;
(C) that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques.
In the case of a "United States Person", as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i), the certifications can not be
"clearly erroneous". 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5) (1990).
13. Gregory E. Birkenstock, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of Probable
Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 Geo. LI. 843 (1992) (suggesting that the probable cause standard can b
properly based on the administrative standard as cited in Keith and as first used in Camara v. Miunicipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)); but see, Ira S. Shapiro. The Foreign IntelligenceSurveillance Act: Legislative
Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV J ON LEOIS 119. 152-57 (1977).
14. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court [hereinafter FISCI is described in 50 U.S.C. § 1803
(1990). Designation of judges
(a) Court to hear applications and grant orders; record of denial; transmittal to court of review
The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate seven district court judges from seven
of the United States judicial circuits who shall constitute a court which shall have jurisdiction to hear
applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States
under the procedures set forth in this Act ....
(d) Tenure
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government applications for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. The FISA
court has never rejected an application for a surveillance order., In fact, 5,160
applications were approved through the end of 1989.16 This alarming approval rate
coupled with the likelihood of prosecution for criminal violations detected as a
result of the electronic surveillance, illustrates the deterioration of Fourth
Amendment rights as a result of the relaxed probable cause standard.
To put this problem into full focus, consider that the fruits of FISA electronic
surveillance can be and are used as evidence in criminal prosecutions against
targets." The issue before the courts has been whether allowing electronic
surveillance on anything less than the traditional probable cause standard for the
issuance of a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. Federal circuit
courts that have reviewed this challenge to FISA have followed a primary purpose
test."8 This test states that if the primary purpose of the electronic surveillance,
both as proposed in the application1" and as actually conducted under FISA
authorization, was to properly secure foreign intelligence information, rather than
to improperly aid in criminal investigations, then the fruits of the surveillance will
be admissible in a criminal trial. In reviewing these challenges, one circuit has
extended the primary purpose test by holding that otherwise valid FISA
Each judge designated under this section shall so serve for a maximum of seven years and shall not
be eligible for redesignation .
15. James E. Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Tine for Reappraisal, 24 INT'L LAW.
1043, 1043 (1990).
16. Attorney General's Message to the President of the Senate, S ExEc COMm No. 2,859 (Apr. 13,
1990) (providing FISA figure): Meason, id.
17. United States % Mcgahey. '53 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y 1982), a.ffd 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983);
see generally. United States v Posey, 864 F 2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989): United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d
959 (9th Cir. 1988). United States v. Pelton. 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1010
(1988): United States v. Ott. 827 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1987) (military court martial); United States v.
Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987). Matter of Kevork, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986) (criminal
prosecution in Canada): United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Belficld, 692
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982): United States v. Spanjol, 720 F.Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Falvey,
540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y, 1982).
18. The primary purpose test was first announced in a case not involving a FISA application but
reviewing electronic surveillance based on national security interests. United States v, Truong Dinh Hung, 629
F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). see also, United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Duggan, 743 F 2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the primary purpose test to FISA surveillance).
19. Court-ordered FISA surveillance requires that a federal officer submit an application containing a
statement of reasons to believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or the agent of a foreign
power, specified information on the implementation of the surveillance, and a "certification" from a high
ranking executive branch official stating that the official "deems the information sought to be foreign
intelligence information" imd that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804 (1990).
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surveillance is not tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the
fruits of such surveillance may later be used as evidence in a criminal trial.20
Thus, law enforcement officials, with an eye towards future prosecution, can
institute electronic surveillance under the pretext of foreign intelligence gathering.
This action is even encouraged by the disparate probable cause standards of 50
U.S.C. § 1801 (1990) and 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988).1 Given the circuit courts'
permissive standard and the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to address
this probable cause issue, Congress is the only viable route to check the Executive
Branch power. Congress should and must correct the flaw in FISA to preserve the
tattered remains of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause."s They must adopt a
criminal standard for a judicial warrant to issue when electronic surveillance of an
agent of a foreign power is sought by the government. This action is not
unprecedented 3 and is consistent with the checks and balances afforded in our
three-branch system of government.

L THE

HISTORY OF ELECrRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND
THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION

"Eavesdropping is an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as
a nuisance."24 This practice was adopted by the police in conducting criminal

20. Expanding on the holding in United States v. Duggan. 743 F.2d 59. 78 (2d Cir. 1984); see United
States v. Pclton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
21. Traditionally, a criminal search warrant issues on a showing of probable cause to Wlieve that
criminally related objects may be found in a search. In following the traditional probable cause standard. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(i)(b)(i) (1988) requires that the application for electronic surveillance in a criminal
investigation include details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed.
22. See Wasserstrom, supra note 6.
23. Following the Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding
that the protections of the Fourth Amendment did not extend to electronic eavesdropping unaccompanied by
physical trespass), the Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934. ch. 652. Title VI § 607, 48 Stat.
1105 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)). Section 605 of the Act prohibited electronic
eavesdropping. The Supreme Court followed Congress' lead of restricting Executive po'.%cr by prohibiting the
introduction into evidence of the fruits of such wiretaps. Nardone v United States. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
24. Berger v New York. 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTO%,E Co!tIENTAMIES 168).
In Berger. Justice Clark noted the history of eavesdropping in stating:
with the advent of the
At one time the eavesdropper listened by naked car under the caves of houses
telegraph surreptitious interception of messages began. As early as 1862 California found it necessary to
prohibit the practice by statute. Statutes of California 1862, p. 288. CCLX II .. Illinois outlawed it
[wire interception] in 1895 .. . Some 50 years ago a New York legislative committee found that plice
.. .had been tapping telephone lines in New York despite an Act passed in 1895 prohibiting it. 388 US.

CRIMINAL STANDARD FOR PROBABLE CAUSE

investigations with the advent of the telephone.2 5 When confronted with a
constitutional challenge to this action, the Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United
States,2" held in a 5-4 decision that the protections of the Fourth Amendment did
not extend to electronic eavesdropping unaccompanied by physical trespass.
Congress responded to the Olmstead decision and the threat posed to Fourth
Amendment protection, therein, by enacting section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934.27 Section 605 prohibited both unauthorized interception of any
private radio or wire communications and unauthorized use or publication of any
information contained in such communications. The Supreme Court in Nardone v.
United States, 8 held Section 605 applicable to federal law enforcement agents and
barred the introduction of evidence in a criminal trial that was the fruit of illegal
surveillance. This decision did have some deterrent effect on the government when
their objectives were a successful criminal investigation and prosecution. 9
Unfortunately, the Nardone decision and Section 605 had little impact on national
security surveillance for nearly forty years.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt interpreted Section 605 and the Nardone
decision to apply only to "wire-tapping investigations."3 0 He remained, "convinced
that the Supreme Court never intended any dictum

. . .

to apply to grave matters

involving the defense of the nation."' In 1940, he authorized Attorney General
Robert Jackson to approve federal agent wiretaps directed at persons suspected of
subversive activity. In 1946, upon the recommendation of Attorney General Clark,
President Truman expanded the surveillance program to include domestic cases.32
The Church Committee found that electronic surveillance was increased by each

41, 45-46 (1967).
25. During prohibition days wiretaps were the principal source of information relied upon by the police
as the basis for prosecutions. Id. at 46. See also, S. REP. No. 95-604, Part I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess 10 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3911 (discussing Attorney General William D. Mitchell's authorization
of telephone wiretapping of syndicated bootleggers and exceptional cases where crimes are substantial and
serious).
26. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
27. Communications Act of 1934 ch. 652, § 607, 48 Stat. 1105 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1976)).
28. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
29. See William P. Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE LJ 792. 793-97 (1954).
30. Confidential Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert H. Jackson (May 21, 1940),
reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673-74 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
31. Id. at 673.
32. Letter from Tom C. Clark to Harry S. Truman (July 17, 1946), reprinted In Zwelbon, 516 F.2d at
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succeeding administration. 3
In Katz v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court finally filled the void of Fourth
Amendment reasoning on the issue of electronic surveillance. The Supreme Court
held that Fourth Amendment protections did apply to electronic surveillance" but
once again, left the issue of national security surveillance open." In the same year
as Katz, the court struck down an attempt by the State of New York to establish
statutory procedures for electronic surveillance. The Court held in Berger v. New
York37 that New York statutory procedures were too broad and violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by not articulating with sufficient
particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
As with Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, Congress once again
responded to a Supreme Court decision by enacting the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Acta which limited Executive power. Title III0 of this Act
established the procedures for obtaining a judicial warrant for electronic
surveillance in a criminal investigation. However, Congress expressly exempted
Executive action undertaken to protect the nation from domestic and foreign
threats. 40 This left the national security exemption open for the next decade until
Congress enacted FISA.
The national security exception was more clearly defined in one Supreme Court
case in the decade before the enactment of FISA. In United States v. United
States District Court,"' better known as the Keith case, the Supreme Court was
presented the issue of whether the President had the power to authorize electronic
surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval.' 2 The
Court held that this Executive action must be exercised in a manner consistent
with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Executive must obtain a warrant through

33. See Church Committee, supra note 7.
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead. 277 U.S. 438).
35. Id. at 353.
36. Id. at 358 n.23.
37. 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
38. PuB. L No. 351, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess. 197 (1968) (current version at 18 US.C.A. § 2516 (1988)).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988) (authorization for interception): Id. § 2518 (procedure for interception).
Title IIl was upheld on a constitutional challenge in United States v. Tortorello. 480 F-2d 764. cert. denied.
414 U.S. 866 (1973).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968) (repealed 1978) (nothing contained in Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control & Safe Street Act of 1968 or 47 U.S.C. § 605 shall limit the constitutional power of the president to
conduct electronic surveillance if the surveillance is deemed essential to national security).
41. 407 US. 297 (1972).
42. Id. at 299.
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prior judicial approval before conducting electronic surveillance in domestic
security matters. 43 The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment freedoms can not
be properly guaranteed if conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive
branch and noted that inherent in the concept of the warrant requirement is its
issuance by a "neutral and detached magistrate."' 4
The Court delineated the scope of the decision by leaving open the remainder of
the Fourth Amendment national security exception." The Court made it clear that
Congress would have great latitude under Fourth Amendment reasonableness
grounds to legislate a warrant requirement for domestic security."
A narrow interpretation of the Keith decision was followed by two circuit court
decisions holding that the President had constitutional power to conduct
warrantless electronic foreign intelligence surveillance through his role as the chief
executive officer in foreign affairs. 4 However, the broad interpretation of the Keith
decision was not accepted by the Court of Appeals in Zweibon v. Mitchell.48 The
court sitting en banc htld that ,:,. Executive's warrantless electronic surveillance
of a domestic group that is not an agent of a foreign power violates the Fourth
Amendment. 49 This conflict between the circuits in interpreting Keith was left
unreconciled by the Supreme Court. Congress, however, followed the Keith,
Brown, and Butenko decisions by legislating into FISA a non-criminal probable
cause standard based on the Fourth Amendment national security exception.

43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 316 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 356).
45. "'Wehave not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect
to activities of foreign po~ers or their agents. Nor does our decision rest on the language of § 2511(3) or any
other section of Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does not
attempt to define or delineate the powers of the President to meet domestic threats to the national security.'*
407 U.S. at 321-22 (footnote omitted).
46. Shapiro. supra note 13. at 139.
47. United States v. Brown. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973). cert. denied 415 U.S, 960 (1974); United
States v.Butenko. 494 F,2d 593 (3d Cir 1974).
48. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). cert. denied 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
49. Id. at 614.
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THE GROUNDS FOR A NON-CRIMINAL PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD UNDER

FISA
A.

A Second Look at the Keith National Security Exception

The legislative history of FISA indicates that Congress relied upon the Supreme
Court decision in Keith to justify a departure from the non-criminal probable
cause standard.5" Thus, a close look at the Keith decision is necessary to
understand the grounds for the Court's departure in dictum from traditional
Fourth Amendment requirements." The Supreme Court noted the potential
distinctions between criminal surveillance under Title I1 2 and those involving
domestic security.53 Based on these distinctions, the Court invited Congress to
enact protective standards that would potentially differ from Title III standards."
The Court stated that the legislated standards "may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable in relation to the legitimate need of the
government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens."5 "
The sole precedent for the Court's statement was the Fourth Amendment
departure allowed in Camara v. Municipal Court."5
In Camara, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search by a municipal
building inspector violated the Fourth Amendment. 7 The second part of the
decision addressed the issue of whether a judicial warrant allowing a general
search of all housing units could issue upon information about the substandard
health and safety conditions of the neighborhood. The Keith court relied upon this
second part of the Camara decision to support its departure. s The Court held that
a municipality could obtain an administrative warrant from a magistrate
authorizing an area-wide search based upon particularized information about the

50. S REP No 604, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess., pt.I (1978), reprinted In 95 US.C-C.A.N 3904. 3914-16.
51 In Keith. the court held that the Executive did not have authority to conduct %arrantless electronic
surveillance of a domestic group. 407 U.S. at 320. However, the Court limited the co,crage of this ho!ding. in
dictum in part IV of the decision, by refusing to decide the issue of Lhether the Executive has authority to
conduct surveillance for national security purposes. Id. at 321-24.
52. Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (current version at 18 US.C.
§ 2518 (1988))
53. Keith. 407 U.S. at 322.
54. Id. at 322-23.
55. Id. at 323.
56. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). This was the only case cited b) the court for the proposition stated
57. 387 U.S. at 534.
58. See citation and quote in Keith. 407 U.S at 323.
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neighborhood.5 9
The Court based the holding on the following three factors to emphasize the
reasonableness of the search allowed: 0 1) the long history of judicial and public
acceptance of health and safety inspections,6" 2) the public interest demands that
all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, and 3) the fact that the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of evidence of
crime. The Court continued by emphasizing that the facts that would justify an
inference of probable cause for an administrative search are "clearly different from
those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been
undertaken. '6 2 When these factors are applied to electronic surveillance of an
agent of a foreign power under FISA, Congress and the Supreme Court's
misplaced reliance on the Camara decision is revealed.
Camara relied first on the history of judicial and public acceptance of regulatory
government searches affecting health or public safety.6 3 The Court cited Frank v.
State of Maryland,64 for the proposition that the public has long accepted health
officials' inspections by utilizing this means to meet public health needs. 5 While
this may be plausible in the area of public health, it has been rejected where the
potential for criminal prosecution exists. 6 Neither the Supreme Court nor the
legislature, in representing the public, has accepted electronic surveillance in the
absence of a criminal showing of probable cause.' Furthermore, Section 605 of
the Communications Act of 1934, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, and FISA were all enacted in response to governmental abuse of
citizen privacy.68
The second Camara factor justifying a relaxed probable cause standard is that
eradicating public hazards is a necessity not reasonably achievable by other

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
"neither

387 U.S. at 538.
Id. at 537.
Id., (citing Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959)).
387 U.S. at 538.
387 U.S. at 537
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
387 U.S. at 537. (quoting Frank, 359 U.S. at 372).
The Court in Camara explained that a relaxed probable cause showing in administrative searches
endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the
probable cause requirement in this area. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
67. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1988).
68. See generally. vupra text accompanying notes 7 and 8.
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means.6 9 This argument has great significance in the national security context.
There is undoubtedly a public need that rises to the level of "necessity" when the
security of the nation is threatened. However, there are obvious differences
between a housing code inspection and electronic surveillance. Housing code
inspections target violations that can not be detected, with any administrative
efficiency, absent an area-wide authorization to search, 70 while electronic
surveillance of an agent of a foreign power presupposes the identification of an
individual to be targeted.7 1 -"Administrative efficiency" is meaningless if a target is
already identified. Furthermore, once the government has identified the target of
the surveillance, all that remains to satisfy the Fourth Amendment are details of
the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed7 2 in
order to conform to traditional warrant requirements. This is hardly a burdensome
requirement to legislate when balanced against legitimate concern for privacy
rights.
The third factor justifying administrative searches in Camara was that such
searches are neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of evidence of a
crime.7 3 An area-wide public safety inspection, certainly, is neither personal in
nature nor aimed at discovery of criminal evidence. However, electronic
surveillance of an agent of a foreign power is, by definition, personal and aimed at
discovering information about potential criminal violations involving issues of
national security.7 4 Consider also that the scope of the invasion of privacy involved
in a public safety inspection is minimal compared to the broad-based collection of
information which is inevitable when electronic surveillance is conducted.78

69. 387 U.S. at 537.
70. 387 U.S. at 535-36.
71. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A-D) (1990) (defining an agent of a foreign power as an individual or
person); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b)(1)(A) (1990) (requiring that the order specify the identity of the target of the
surveillance).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(i) (1990) (probable cause requirement forelectronic surveillance in
criminal investigation).
73. 387 U.S. at 537.
74. By Executive Order, affidavits in support of applications for electronic surveillance under FISA may
be made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Defense, among others.
both of whom have jurisdiction to prosecute for criminal violations. Exec. Order No 12139. 44 Fed. Reg.
30,311 (1979) (reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (1990)).
75. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (1990) the government can obtain an order authorizing electronic
surveillance for 90 days. The order can be extended by application for an additional year under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(d)(2) (1990). The wiretap allows the listener to detect all conversations from the most mundane to the
most intimate and private.
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Thus, Congress' de facto reliance on Camara, by citing Keith70 in the legislative
history of FISA, is misplaced. The Camara case is a Fourth Amendment
anomaly" and does not articulate a probable cause standard consistent with the
traditional privacy concerns associated with government intrusions.7 0 The Supreme
Court's refusal to more sharply define the national security exception 70 or, in the
alternative, to resolve conflicting circuit court decisions interpreting the exception 0
forces a legislative remedy.
B. Justice Department Influence on FISA
The United States Justice Department, hereinafter the Justice Department,
claimed that a departure from the criminal standard of probable cause is justified
by the need to protect national security. Attorney General Levi stated that:
[tihe purpose of criminalization, and of prosecution for crime, is to deter
certain activities deemed contrary to the public interest. The purpose of
foreign intelligence surveillances is, of course, to gain information about the
activities of foreign agents, not so much because those activities are dangerous
in themselves-although they almost always are-but because they provide
knowledge about the hostile actions and intentions and capabilities of foreign
powers, knowledge vital to the safety of the nation.8"
The crux of the Justice Department's argument for a non-criminal standard is that
76. A quote by Justice Holmes is applicable to the Supreme Court reasoning in Keith. "Great cases, like
hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure." Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 157.
78. One noted criminal procedure commentator suggests that an even stricter probable cause standard,
than the one proposed in this article, could be applied. Professor Wayne R. LaFave wrote, "it might still be
argued that there are a few search practices (such as eavesdropping and wiretapping, search of a private home
during the nighttime, or intrusions into the human body) which, because of their unusual degree of
intrusiveness, require more than the usual quantum of probable cause." WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H
ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3(b), at 140 (2d ed. 1992).
79. No FISA case to date has been reviewed by the Supreme Court.
80. Zweibon, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Butenko, 494 F.2d 593
(3d Cir.). cert. denied 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 415 U.S. 960
(1974).
81. Senate Intelligence Committee, 1976 Intelligence Committee Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-79
(statement of Attorney General Levi).
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federal criminal laws are inadequate to cover the potential threats to national
security. Thus, a strict adherence to a criminal standard would, in some
circumstances, prohibit the government's surveillance of agents of a foreign power
engaged in threatening activities. The legislative history of FISA indicates that
Congress accepted these arguments in departing from the criminal standard 1
The Justice Department's chief concern was the heavily debated issue of
whether the federal espionage statute83 would be narrowly construed by the courts
when reviewing FISA applications for probable cause.8' However, in 1941 in Gorin
v. United States,8 the Supreme Court addressed this concern by holding that the
term "national defense" in the espionage statute should be read broadly. 00
Likewise, the Justice Department's position that federal criminal laws do not
adequately cover the potential threats to national security is contradicted by even a
cursory reading of the crimes included in the United States Code.87
Even if a change in the judicial interpretation of these statutes occurred, the
Justice Department's position fails to distinguish between substantive criminal
proof and procedural criminal standards. A criminal conviction requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" while a warrant requires a probable cause showing.ea
Thus, the government is only required to establish a probability of criminal
activity and not a prima fade showing. This distinction undermines the Justice
Department's claim that courts may narrowly interpret federal criminal law in the
area of national defense thereby prohibiting the government's ability to obtain a
warrant for surveillance. Moreover, amending current criminal statutes or enacting
new ones is a far more acceptable course of action than legislating an exception to
the Fourth Amendment.

82. See S REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.. 82 (1978). reprinted in 95 US.C.C.A.N. 3904. 3967
(Minority Views of Senator James Abourezk).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1977) (criminalizing the delivery information relating to national defense to a
foreign government or power).
84. This issue was debated in both 1976 and 1977 hearings concerning FISA. First by Attome) Gcral
Levi. 1976 Intelligence Committee Hearings, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. at 78-79, and then by Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell. 1977 Judiciary Committee Hearings, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 80 (1977).
85. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
86. Id. at 28.
87. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 791 (espionage); 18 US.C § 831 (explosives). 18 U.S.C. § 921 (firearms):
18 U.S.C. § 2151 (sabotage); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (treason, sedition and subversive activities).
88. See. WAYNE R LAFAVE & AuSTIN W ScoTT. JR. CRIMINAL MvAw. § 1.8(0. at 58 (2d d. 1986);
CHARLES T MCCORMICK ET AL. EVIDENCE, § 336-37. at 424-32. (4th ed. 1992).
89. Berger. 388 US. at 54-55.
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III. THE NEED FOR CONGRESS TO CORRECT FISA
A.

Disparate Probable Cause Standards Invite Executive Abuse

Where the constitutional basis for a departure from the traditional probable
cause standard is unsound and the Executive Branch reason for this departure is
weak, Congress must re-examine the Fourth Amendment exception legislated
under FISA. In doing so, Congress will recognize that the primary purpose test
established by the circuit courts invites Executive abuse of the warrant
requirement. Such potential for abuse is due to the disparate probable cause
standards legislated under 50 U.S.C. Section 1801 (1990) and 18 U.S.C.
Section 2518 (1988).9 0
This disparity presents the Executive Branch with a choice when conducting an
investigation of a target engaged in criminal activity involving national security.
The Executive Branch can proceed under 18 U.S.C. Section 2518 and obtain a
warrant for electronic surveillance based upon a traditional probable cause
showing, or they can proceed under the relaxed standard allowed in 50 U.S.C.
Section 1801. The choice is obvious, and the danger of abuse is clear when you
consider that FISA applications are freely granted.9 1
Thus, the Executive Branch can use FISA to circumvent the traditional
probable cause standard required to obtain a warrant for electronic surveillance in
a criminal investigation.92 Then, at a hearing to suppress the evidence, the
government can make the pretextual claim that the purpose of the surveillance was
for foreign intelligence gathering.9 3 This is not only allowable under FISA but
invited by the relaxed probable cause standard.
Congress can correct the unconstitutional probable cause standard under FISA
and eliminate the potential for Executive abuse by amending the Act. The
amendment is simple. The Act should require the Executive Branch to make a
probable cause showing in its application that conforms to the criminal standard.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should be required to find probable
cause based on the criminal standard before it issues a warrant. In the absence of
judicial authorization to conduct electronic surveillance, the court in a subsequent
criminal trial must suppress the illegally obtained evidence. This restriction on the

90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See

supra text
supra text
18 U.S.C.
supra text

accompanying note 21.
accompanying notes 15 and 16.
§ 2518 (1988).
accompanying notes 18 and 20.
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0
Executive Branch's authority to conduct electronic surveillance is onsistent with 4
and conforms to traditional Fourth Amendment warrant standards.

B.

The President's Extra-ConstitutionalForeign Affairs Powers

One final point worthy of note concerns the President's invocation of inherent
foreign affairs powers95 to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
gathering. This Presidential authorization is limited to the conduct of foreign
affairs and, as such, can be limited by Congress' legislative powers' when
domestic affairs are affected. Also, the President's exercise of inherent powers
must conform to constitutional prohibitions. 7
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,"3 the Supreme Court held

that a congressional resolution authorizing the President to impose an embargo
and to prosecute violators was not an improper delegation of congressional
legislative power. The Court reasoned that the President had inherent foreign
affairs powers that were exercised pursuant to congressional delegation."" The
Supreme Court established the limits of this inherent power in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.100 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube, the Court held that the
President's wartime seizure of a United States steel mill was an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power."' 1 The court reasoned that the President's sei7ure of
the mills was domestic, therefore, the action was outside the scope of inherent
foreign affairs powers.ro2
Since FISA authorizes the President to conduct electronic surveillance in the

94. See Wasserstrom, supra note 6.
95. The President exercises textually committed and implied powers under the constitution. Specifically,
he is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, US CoNsT. art. 11.§ 2. cl I; he makes treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate, US CoNsr art. II, § 2. cl.
2; he nominates and appoints ambassadors with
the advice and consent of the Senate. US. CoN'sT art. I1.§ 2,cl.
2; and he receives ambassadors and other
public ministers, US. CONST. art. 11. § 3.
96. US CoNsr. art. 1, § I provides, -[all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States ...."
97. In Reid v. Covert, 354 US. 1, 17 (1957). the Supreme Court eld that executive agreements made
pursuant to inherent executive power must observe constitutional prohibitions. See Chip Purdy. Comment.
ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Act: Unconstitutional Warrant CriteriaPermit Wiretappingif a Possibility
of International Terrorism is Found, 17 SAN DIEGO L REV 963. 977 (1980).
98. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
99. Id. at 319-20.
100. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
101. Id. at 585.
102. Id. at 585-88.
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United States for foreign intelligence gathering, the Act can be characterized as
regulating both domestic and foreign affairs. However, the President's exercise of
this authorization by targeting agents of a foreign power involves more than the
conduct of foreign affairs. The President's foreign affairs role changes to a
domestic role 103 when criminal prosecution is instituted against the target. This
dual role creates the potential for abuse. In order to eliminate Executive abuse,
Congressional authorization through FISA should include constitutional
safeguards provided by the traditional warrant requirement.

CONCLUSION

An exhaustive examination of the probable cause standard under FISA can
ultimately be reduced to the basic question posed in the Fourth Amendment. At
what point do individual rights succumb to societal interests? In my call for FISA
reform, I do not suggest that the individual enjoys a right to privacy that is
absolute. Rather, I maintain that the criminal standard of probable cause
conforms to the traditionally accepted public/private demarcation. This is
bolstered by the likelihood of criminal prosecution which adds an additional liberty
interest to this rights-based analysis.
"In our governmental structure, the Executive is endowed with enormous power
to protect national security and enforce the laws of the land." 10 Such power is
subject to abuse when left unchecked. The separation of powers doctrine
contemplates that all branches of the federal government have a duty to protect
individual rights. Therefore, Executive assertions of national security interest
cannot serve as an acceptable talisman for the abrogation of privacy rights because
this is tantamount to complete deference to Executive will.
Congress cannot legislate disparate probable cause standards and rely on the
Executive's pure intentions when seeking a warrant to conduct surveillance. The
abuses of the Executive are too well documented to merit this reliance. Likewise,
Congress cannot idly watch the deterioration of Fourth Amendment protections by
the judiciary based on reasonableness grounds. Congress must be ever mindful of,
and vigilant in upholding, its duty to protect individual rights on the basis that it is
the branch closest to those governed.

103. US CONST art. II. § I reads, -the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."
104. New York Times v Sullivan. 403 L.S. 713, 727-28 (1971) (Stewart. J., concurring).

